Compliance, corruption and co-management::how corruption fuels illegalities and undermines the legitimacy of fisheries co-management by Nunan, Fiona et al.
 
 
Compliance, corruption and co-management:
Nunan, Fiona; Cepic, Drazen; Yongo, Ernest; Saleh, Mwanahamis; Mbilingi, Bwambale;
Odongkara, Konstantine; Onyango, Paul; Mlahagwa, Elizabeth; Owili, Monica
DOI:
10.18352/ijc.827
License:
Creative Commons: Attribution (CC BY)
Document Version
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Citation for published version (Harvard):
Nunan, F, Cepi, D, Yongo, E, Saleh, M, Mbilingi, B, Odongkara, K, Onyango, P, Mlahagwa, E & Owili, M 2018,
'Compliance, corruption and co-management: how corruption fuels illegalities and undermines the legitimacy of
fisheries co-management', International Journal of the Commons. https://doi.org/10.18352/ijc.827
Link to publication on Research at Birmingham portal
Publisher Rights Statement:
Nunan, F. et al., (2018). Compliance, corruption and co-management: how corruption fuels illegalities and undermines the legitimacy of
fisheries co-management. International Journal of the Commons. 12(2), p.None. DOI: http://doi.org/10.18352/ijc.827
General rights
Unless a licence is specified above, all rights (including copyright and moral rights) in this document are retained by the authors and/or the
copyright holders. The express permission of the copyright holder must be obtained for any use of this material other than for purposes
permitted by law.
•	Users may freely distribute the URL that is used to identify this publication.
•	Users may download and/or print one copy of the publication from the University of Birmingham research portal for the purpose of private
study or non-commercial research.
•	User may use extracts from the document in line with the concept of ‘fair dealing’ under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 (?)
•	Users may not further distribute the material nor use it for the purposes of commercial gain.
Where a licence is displayed above, please note the terms and conditions of the licence govern your use of this document.
When citing, please reference the published version.
Take down policy
While the University of Birmingham exercises care and attention in making items available there are rare occasions when an item has been
uploaded in error or has been deemed to be commercially or otherwise sensitive.
If you believe that this is the case for this document, please contact UBIRA@lists.bham.ac.uk providing details and we will remove access to
the work immediately and investigate.
Download date: 01. Feb. 2019
International Journal of the Commons
Vol. 12, no 2 2018, pp. xx–xx
Publisher: Uopen Journals
URL:http://www.thecommonsjournal.org
DOI: 10.18352/ijc.827
Copyright: content is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 License
ISSN: 1875-0281
Compliance, corruption and co-management: how  corruption 
fuels illegalities and undermines the legitimacy of fisheries 
co-management
Fiona Nunan
International Development Department, University of Birmingham, UK
F.S.Nunan@bham.ac.uk
Dražen Cepić
Department of Sociology, University of Zadar, Croatia
Ernest Yongo
Kenya Marine and Fisheries Research Institute, Kenya
Mwanahamis Salehe
Tanzania Fisheries Research Institute, Tanzania
Bwambale Mbilingi
National Fisheries Resources Research Institute, Uganda
Konstantine Odongkara
National Fisheries Resources Research Institute, Uganda
Paul Onyango
Department of Fisheries and Aquatic Science,
University of Dar es Salaam, Tanzania
Elizabeth Mlahagwa
Tanzania Fisheries Research Institute, Tanzania
Monica Owili
Kenya Marine and Fisheries Research Institute, Kenya
2 Fiona Nunan et al.
Abstract: Links between corruption and illegal practices within fisheries are 
recognised in existing literature but little reference has been made to how these 
interconnected practices affect the performance and legitimacy of fisheries co-
management. Research in the three countries bordering Lake Victoria, Kenya, 
Tanzania and Uganda, found that corruption is systemic and that members of 
all stakeholder groups – fishers, fisheries officers, police and the judiciary – are 
implicated. It was confirmed that corruption is strongly linked to illegalities and 
that corruption in this context should be viewed as a collective action problem, 
with fishers reluctant to invest in legal gears and methods when they perceive 
illegalities and corruption to be prevalent. It was also found that corrupt practices 
linked to illegalities discourages local level fisheries management structures – 
the Beach Management Units – from enforcing regulations and contributes to 
a lack of trust between fishers and government. Linked corruption and illegal 
fisheries practices were therefore found to be undermining the performance and 
legitimacy of co-management. This article concludes that whilst co-management 
offers opportunities for collusive corruption through collaborative arrangements, 
any management system will be susceptible to the harmful effects of corruption 
where it is systemic and is not formally recognised or appropriately addressed. 
Greater official recognition of the links between corruption and illegalities, and a 
range of appropriate actions taken to this collective action problem, is essential if 
co-management is to have a chance of success.
Keywords: Compliance, corruption, fisheries co-management, fisheries illegali-
ties, Lake Victoria, legitimacy
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1. Introduction
The adoption of a co-management approach in fisheries often stems from a desire 
to improve compliance with regulations, driven in part by a belief that bringing 
resource users into management will incentivise compliance (Jentoft 2000; Evans 
et al. 2011; Cinner and Huchery 2014). Yet, the ability of co-management to deliver 
on improved compliance has not been unequivocally demonstrated (Cinner and 
Huchery 2014). Efforts to understand why this is may draw on research into the 
prevalence of illegalities, which has focused on the motivations of fishers to com-
ply or not comply, identifying a range of economic and social/moral motivations 
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(Kuperan and Sutinen 1998; Raakjær Nielsen 2003; Gezelius and Hauck 2011). 
Corruption, through the payment of bribes to avoid sanctions and to enable illegal 
practices to continue, has been shown to also be a factor in weak enforcement and 
non-compliance (Gezelius and Hauck 2011; Sundström 2016). To date, though, 
there is limited evidence available on how corruption associated with fishing ille-
galities affects governance systems.
Literature on fisheries co-management specifically is almost silent on the 
issue of corruption. Broadly understood as ‘an arrangement where responsibil-
ity for resource management is shared between the government and user groups’ 
(Sen and Raakjær Nielsen 1996, 406), research has identified factors that influ-
ence the potential for success in co-management as including the nature and 
performance of leadership, having legal mandate in place and delivering effec-
tive community training and empowerment (Pomeroy et al. 2001; Napier et al. 
2005). Referring to a broader range of resources and settings, literature on gov-
erning common pool resources has also identified a wealth of factors needed 
for success (Agrawal 2003). There is little literature, however, that specifi-
cally identifies factors that undermine or lead to the failure of co-management, 
though literature on success factors implies that the absence of such conditions 
threatens success. This paper examines how governance systems, in particu-
lar co-management, may be affected by corruption linked to illegal practices 
and seeks to answer the following overarching question: how does corruption 
linked to fisheries illegalities affect the performance and legitimacy of fisheries 
co-management?
This is of critical concern to the inland fishery of Lake Victoria, East Africa. 
Illegalities are believed to be highly prevalent on the lake and this prevalence 
is one of several challenges identified by the lake management authority as a 
threat to the sustainability of the fisheries (LVFO 2015a, 2016). This is partic-
ularly the case for the highly valuable Nile perch fishery, of which stocks are 
believed to have depleted since the early 2000s, leading to the development of a 
‘Nile perch recovery plan’ (LVFO 2015a). The lake is the second largest fresh-
water body in the world, covering 68,800 km2, with around 1500 landing sites 
and 200,000 fishers (LVFO 2015b), and is bordered by Kenya, Tanzania and 
Uganda. Co-management was introduced to the lake from the late 1990s through 
the formation of community-based structures known as Beach Management Units 
(BMUs). Co-management has not, however, been seen to have led to a reduction 
in illegalities or to greater sustainability of fish stocks (Mkumbo and Marshall 
2015; Etiegni et al. 2017). In addition, payment of bribes to avoid arrest or fines 
when caught undertaking illegalities has been consistently reported, both before 
and since the introduction of co-management (Geheb 1997; Allison 2003; Eggert 
and Lokina 2010; Etiegni et al. 2017). Despite this, there has been no official 
recognition of any connection between corruption and illegalities, with fisheries 
management plans identifying illegalities as a challenge but silent on the subject 
of corruption, and no recognition that corruption may affect the performance of 
BMUs and the wider co-management system.
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Further rationale for focusing on the case of Lake Victoria comes from the 
ranking of the countries bordering the lake in the Corruption Perceptions Index of 
Transparency International. Tanzania, Kenya and Uganda are ranked 117, 139 and 
139 respectively out of 168 countries (Transparency International 2016), suggest-
ing that relative to many other countries, corruption is perceived to be significant 
in the public sector of these three East African countries. This is supported by 
a bribery survey in East Africa, in which the majority of respondents in Kenya, 
Tanzania and Uganda described the level of corruption as high and reported that 
it had increased in the previous year (Transparency International-Kenya 2014). 
Respondents reported that bribes were largely paid to speed up access to services, 
secure access to services or to avoid problems with officials. Police services were 
cited across East Africa as being most likely to ask for a bribe. Further, corruption 
has been reported as being ‘embedded’ or ‘institutionalised’ in these countries 
(Hope 2014; Muhumuza 2016), making it hard to avoid and to address. These 
sources suggest that corruption may be expected to occur within the fisheries sec-
tor, reflecting the situation within wider society.
This article builds on and contributes to two areas of literature: corruption and 
illegalities in small-scale fisheries, and legitimacy and fisheries co-management. 
The contribution to literature on corruption and illegalities in small-scale fisher-
ies is seen in the evidence of the scale and diversity of actors involved in petty 
corruption within the inland fisheries of Lake Victoria. Previous research (for 
example Sundström 2015) focused on inspectors tasked with enforcing fisheries 
regulations, but this research shows how BMU Committee members, the police, 
judiciary and local politicians are also involved. This finding demonstrates the 
systemic and collective action nature of corruption in small-scale fisheries. The 
contribution to literature on legitimacy and co-management is twofold. Firstly, 
the research provides evidence of how co-management is undermined by the 
lack of genuine enforcement, which is not just due to lack of capacity but to the 
desire to gain financially by those tasked with enforcement. The evidence also 
shows that co-management is undermined by the lack of incentives for BMUs 
to take enforcement seriously when corruption linked to illegalities is endemic. 
Secondly, the research demonstrates that undermining of the performance of co-
management undermines its legitimacy, by leading to questions about the ability 
of BMUs to play an effective role in fisheries management and from the eroded 
trust between fishers and authorities (fisheries staff, police, judiciary and local 
politicians). The article therefore concludes that the prevalence of corruption and 
its intrinsic link to illegalities has the potential to undermine the performance and 
legitimacy of co-management.
The article begins by a review of literature on compliance, corruption and 
legitimacy in fisheries, which guided data analysis and answering the research 
question. A section on methods sets out how the data collection and analysis 
were conducted and is followed by the findings. A discussion section relates the 
findings to existing literature and answers the research question, followed by a 
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conclusion that emphasises the critical challenge posed by the entrenched link 
between corruption and illegalities for fisheries management.
2. Literature review
Literature on compliance with fisheries regulations primarily focuses on identify-
ing motivating factors for non-compliance, clustering factors into two categories: 
rationalist and normative (Kuperan and Sutinen 1998; Raakjær Nielsen 2003; 
Hauck 2008). The rationalist perspective views fisherfolk as making rational deci-
sions based on the costs and benefits of undertaking certain activities, bearing in 
mind the perceived likelihood of being caught and the likely sanction. A norma-
tive perspective investigates how compliance is influenced by norms, morality, 
perceived legitimacy of regulations and systems, and other social and cultural 
influences. Such perspectives are not incompatible and both have been drawn on 
to investigate and explain behaviour within fisheries (Kuperan and Sutinen 1998; 
Gezelius and Hauck 2011). Within this literature, there is some recognition of the 
role of corruption in weak enforcement and motivating non-compliance (see, for 
example, Kuperan and Sutinen 1998; Gezelius and Hauck 2011; Pomeroy et al. 
2015; Sundström 2016), but overall this literature says little about the extent and 
effect of corrupt behaviour on the effectiveness of enforcement or the desire to 
comply with regulations (Sundström 2012). Nøstbakken (2008, 299), for exam-
ple, notes that ‘little work has been done when it comes to including corruption 
and bribery into formal models of compliance in fisheries’.
Corruption linked to illegalities within fisheries has been shown to include at 
least three practices: inspectors carry out inadequate enforcement, share details 
of enforcement operations with fishers to give advanced warning and participate 
themselves in illegal fisheries (Sundström 2015). Such practices imply that trust 
and social ties between fishers and inspectors facilitate bribes in exchange for 
non-enforcement of rules and legislation (Sundström 2013). Yet corruption also 
leads to reduced trust between fishers and government officers, as the trust of 
some fishers in government officers reduces as they see officers demand and/
or accept bribes (Sundström 2013), with implications for the effectiveness and 
legitimacy of fisheries management. The willingness of government officers 
tasked with enforcement to engage in corruption has been attributed to the desire 
to supplement meagre salaries (Medard et al. 2016; Etiegni et al. 2017), as well as 
to the allocation of insufficient resources for enforcement and politicians interfer-
ing in fisheries management, not wanting their potential voters to be sanctioned 
(Pomeroy et al. 2015).
The nature of corrupt practices linked to fisheries enforcement suggests that 
this is ‘petty corruption’, as opposed to grand corruption, involving collusion 
and ‘bribes to enforcement officials to evade sanctions’ (Sundström 2016, 73). 
Corruption has also been perceived to result from imbalances of power between 
actors (Anders and Nuijten 2007; Williams and Le Billon 2017), leading to 
corruption being ‘embedded in the wider matrix of power relations in society’ 
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(Anders and Nuijten 2007, 2). In the context of fisheries, government officers, 
including the police, are more able to demand bribes from fishers, particularly 
from poorer fishers, who have little power to resist and want to avoid going to 
court (Medard et al. 2016).
Willingness to comply by fisherfolk is strongly affected by perceptions of 
legitimacy of regulations and of management systems and structures (Jentoft 
2000; Raakjær Nielsen 2003). Legitimacy of fisheries management is expected 
to increase through the participation of fishers in co-management, which is in 
turn ‘assumed to result in a higher degree of compliance’ (Jentoft 2000, 145). 
Legitimacy stems from the legal mandate underpinning authority, systems and 
measures, yet it also depends on acceptance of these and acceptance of the pro-
cesses that led to such legal mandate and the nature of the systems and measures 
by stakeholders (Sandström et al. 2014). Jentoft (2000, 145) further explains the 
link between legitimacy, compliance and fisheries management through observ-
ing ‘typically, a management system is expected to sustain fish stocks and at the 
same time respect the norms of equity, fairness, and trust that reside within user-
communities. When a system is found to fulfil these qualities and thus obtains 
the status of legitimacy from the perspective on the users, a moral obligation to 
adhere to the rules rest on the user’.
From this review of literature, it can be seen that corruption has been estab-
lished as a factor that encourages non-compliance, is manifested in a range of 
practices by government officers tasked with enforcement and reflects relations of 
power within society. The extent of compliance is also influenced by perceptions 
of legitimacy of rules and management systems.
3. Methods
The data was generated through 133 qualitative interviews conducted with a sam-
ple of actors from key occupational and other stakeholder groups within Lake 
Victoria fisheries, as shown in Table 1.
Qualitative interviews were considered appropriate for generating data to 
answer the research question as they generate rich, in-depth responses on indi-
vidual experiences and perceptions (Punch 2014). A case study was used, of Lake 
Table 1: Study sample.
Country  
 
Sample
Landing 
sites
  BMU 
Leaders
  Boat 
Owners
  Boat 
Crew
  Traders/
processors
  Government 
officers
Kenya   6   6   12   12   9   4
Tanzania   6   6   10   12   12   2
Uganda   6   6   12   12   12   6
TOTAL   18   18   34   36   33   12
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Victoria fisheries, as a case study allows deep investigation whilst recognizing 
the specific context and complexity of the case (Yin 2014). Characteristics of the 
case of Lake Victoria articulated earlier – of limited capacity for enforcement, 
perception of high prevalence of illegalities and situated in a broader context of 
established concern about high levels of corruption in public service – suggest 
that this is a suitable case for the research question posed.
The fieldwork was carried out between April and June 2015 at a sample 
of 18 fish landing sites chosen to reflect a diversity of fisheries communities 
according to island and mainland landing sites, number of boats and main target 
fish species. The fieldwork was carried out by researchers from the fisheries 
research institutes in the region, with interviews undertaken in the appropriate 
local language. These researchers are co-authors of this paper, with the first 
and second authors leading the design of the research and data analysis, and 
also participating in the piloting and some data collection. The researchers from 
the national fisheries research institutes have many years experience in the 
lake region and are known and trusted by fishing communities. This facilitated 
access to the communities and to the fisheries officers. There was no evidence of 
an unwillingness to respond to the questions due to the position of the research 
staff, though the number of interviews conducted assists in establishing the reli-
ability of the data.
The sampling approach involved a mix of purposive sampling (for the fisher-
ies staff and BMU leaders) and convenience sampling within a stratified sampling 
approach for the occupation-based respondents. Members of the BMU Committee 
assisted in identifying and approaching potential respondents present at the beach, 
based on their local knowledge; their involvement may have introduced bias into 
the sample selected, but such potential bias is mitigated by comparing data across 
landing sites and triangulating between interviews.
The research project from which this data and analysis comes sought to inves-
tigate personal networks and experiences and perspectives on co-management. 
The semi-structured interviews with boat owners, boat crew and fish traders/pro-
cessors had five sections: knowledge of BMU structures, activities and perfor-
mance; compliance and legitimacy; social groupings; occupation, wellbeing and 
trust; and, future plans, informed by knowledge of, and attitudes to, the condi-
tion of the fisheries. This paper draws mainly on the section on ‘compliance and 
legitimacy’ and to a more limited extent on the interviews with BMU leaders 
and fisheries staff, which focused on their work and experiences of co-manage-
ment. Respondents were not asked about corruption; data on experience of and 
perspectives on corruption emerged from the interviews. The questions instead 
asked about the experience of respondents of illegal fishing, their perspectives on 
compliance around the lake and why people fish illegally, their knowledge and 
experience of the functioning of the BMUs and the nature and roles of a range 
of interpersonal relationships, between boat crew and boat owners, fishers and 
fish traders, and between fishing communities and fisheries officers and village 
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local governments. The research did not seek in-depth data on the motivations 
and practices of corruption; such data would require an ethnographic approach.
A grounded theory approach was taken to analyse the data on compli-
ance, drawing on the intensive interviews which involved flexible questioning, 
responding to leads generated in responses. The analysis involved initial coding 
of data to categorize and summarize the data, from which more focused coding 
was conducted, prioritizing data according to themes and frequency of occurrence 
(Charmaz 2014). From this focused coding, several key themes associated with 
corruption and compliance emerged, leading to the structure of the findings as 
presented in the Results section. These findings are integrated with the reviewed 
literature to produce Figure 1, which illustrates relationships between corruption, 
compliance and co-management.
Pre-testing of the interview guides took place during an all-team 5-day work-
shop in Tanzania, which involved discussion of the aims of the research and the 
draft interview guides. Informed verbal consent was sought from all respondents 
after the interviewer had fully explained the nature, consequences and poten-
tial risks of the research. Confidentiality and anonymity of the respondents is 
maintained by not recording the names of respondents in data storage and by not 
including the names of the landing sites, districts or countries in reporting. The 
data is presented mainly in the form of quotes, selected to represent the range 
of responses from each occupational group and, for each quote, the country and 
occupational group is given as the source, with a number assigned to each of the 
six landing sites sampled. The inclusion of quotes from a range of occupational 
groups and all countries shows a consistency in the findings. There were no clear 
differences between occupational groups or between countries. There were, of 
course, different experiences and views, but there was also a consistency in the 
data, which is reflected here. The country is not given for the fisheries staff (FS) 
due to the few staff working along the lakeshores and the need for anonymity. The 
occupation-based sample included 85 males and 19 female respondents, reflecting 
the male-dominated composition of Lake Victoria fisheries (LVFO, n.d.).
4. Lake Victoria fisheries
There are three main commercial fisheries within Lake Victoria: Nile perch, Nile 
tilapia and Dagaa, a small sardine-like fish. Nile perch is the most important 
fishery in terms of economic value, with the fishery developed in the 1980s and 
1990s, following the introduction of the fish to the lake in the 1950s. Fish pro-
cessing plants and an associated supply chain facilitate export of the fish to the 
European Union and other parts of the world. However, the Nile perch fishery is 
perceived to have declined in terms of stock, catch size and size of the fish (LVFO 
2015a). Over 95% of the catch comes from these three fisheries. The fisheries are 
described as small-scale and artisanal, meaning that the vessels used are relatively 
small and locally-made and that the fishing enterprises comprise of relatively 
low capital investments. They are therefore labour-intensive, with relationships 
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between actors within the fish chains being critical for access to labour, employ-
ment and fish (Nunan et al. 2018).
Development and enforcement of regulations is led in each country by the 
respective department or ministry of fisheries. Regulations aim to prevent the 
catching of juvenile fish, with minimum mesh and hook sizes and banning of 
indiscriminate fishing gears (beach seines, monofilament nets) and methods (for 
example trawling and tycooning). There are also protected breeding areas and a 
minimum and maximum size for Nile perch. Whilst relying on managing fish-
ing effort is contested by some scientists, who argue for an ecosystem-based 
approach, informed by ecological change as well as fishing effort (Njiru et al. 
2014), there is no evidence that the fisheries regulations are seen as illegitimate or 
controversial by the fishers themselves. On the contrary, evidence (see Cepić and 
Nunan 2017; Etiegni et al. 2017) shows that fishers accept the need for regulation 
and do not question the regulations themselves, though do question how they can 
abide by them given declining stocks and lack of alternative livelihoods.
The three countries harmonize their approach to fisheries management through 
the Lake Victoria Fisheries Organization (LVFO), a structure of the East African 
Community. LVFO is served by a secretariat, which supports decision-making by 
committees formed by the fisheries departments and research institutes of each 
country, with the Council of Ministers being the highest-level decision-making 
body. Initiatives to improve enforcement of regulations include the development 
of the Regional Plan of Action on Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing 
(RPOA-IUU) in 2004. An assessment of MCS on the lake in 2011, however, 
found it to be ineffective (Kariuki 2012). Many reasons were put forward for the 
inadequate results from MCS, including the geography of the lake and lack of 
funding, but other factors have also been seen as important, including the lack of 
political will to enforce regulations, particularly around election times (Kariuki 
2012; Kjær et al. 2012) and the payment of bribes to avoid sanctions for illegali-
ties (Medard et al. 2016; Etiegni et al. 2017).
Illegalities largely consist of the use of undersized gillnets (catching immature 
fish), use of illegal fishing gears (monofilament nets, which can easily get lost 
and be very destructive as a consequence, and beach seines) and use of illegal 
methods, such as cast fishing (Kariuki 2012). The extent of illegal fishing on the 
lake is hard to estimate. Kariuki (2012) drew on a range of evidence, including 
data from the biennial census on vessels and gears (frame surveys), data from 
enforcement activities and expert witnesses, to estimate that one in three fish-
ers use illegal gears. Eggert and Lokina (2010) undertook a quantitative study 
to estimate the extent of illegal fishing in the Tanzanian portion of the lake and 
found that 47% reported alternative compliance and non-compliance behaviour 
and 8% were persistent violators. They calculated the overall violation rate to be 
29%. Whilst then there can be no definitive estimation of the extent of illegalities, 
illegal practices are seen to be a factor in the demise of the Nile perch fishery. The 
Nile perch recovery plan for 2015–2019 refers to there being a ‘significant num-
ber of beach seines and monofilament nets’ (LVFO 2015a, 11) and to a ‘tremen-
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dous increase of illegal gears and practices, making the NP fishery more and more 
vulnerable’ (LVFO 2015a, 26). Factors believed to be driving non-compliance 
include the high cost of legal gears and fear of theft (Etiegni et al. 2011), poverty 
amongst fishers (Cepić and Nunan 2017), weak enforcement (Medard et al. 2016) 
and the perception of violation by other fishers (Eggert and Lokina 2010; Cepić 
and Nunan 2017).
In the late 1990s and early 2000s, co-management was introduced to the lake, 
with support from two donor-funded projects addressing environmental and fish-
eries management. The second project supported a harmonized approach through 
the LVFO but, since the project ended in 2008, resources to support the further 
development of co-management have been limited. The initial lake-wide imple-
mentation of co-management included the formation of BMUs and the election 
and training of committee members. In addition to regular committee meetings, 
BMUs are required to hold assembly meetings, with everyone working within 
fisheries at a landing site encouraged to attend. BMUs are tasked with a range 
of roles including working with government fisheries officers in conducting 
patrols to enforce regulations, keeping a register of people working in fisheries 
at the beach, receiving newcomers, keeping the beach and areas where fish is 
handled and sold clean and planning for development and management activ-
ities. Networks of BMUs were formed soon after the BMUs were established 
and many still exist though are not very active as no funding has been allocated 
by government to support the networks and no other funding source has been 
secured. Government fisheries staff lead in fisheries planning, enforcement and 
quality assurance, and supervise the work of BMUs. The functioning of BMUs, 
particularly in the absence of ongoing technical and financial support, has been 
viewed as mixed, with some effective BMUs and others not functioning at all, or 
perceived as facilitating illegalities (Etiegni et al. 2017).
5. Results
The results are presented according to the themes that emerged from the analysis.
Who is alleged to be involved in corrupt practices; why and how do corrupt 
 practices take place?
Fisheries management on Lake Victoria involves a wide range of actors. Led by 
the fisheries directorates of the three governments, these are represented by fish-
eries staff (fisheries officers and assistants) at decentralised levels of government. 
Fisheries assistants are stationed at some fish landing sites, whilst other landing sites 
are visited occasionally by fisheries staff. Police officers participate in fisheries man-
agement through being involved in occasional patrols (on land or water) and BMU 
Committee members undertake and participate in a range of fisheries management 
activities. In Uganda, a further group has been involved in enforcement. For many 
years, Special Enforcement Officers were deployed outside of the fisheries director-
ate but endorsed by the Minister of Fisheries to focus on enforcing regulations.
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When asked about their knowledge and experience of illegal fishing, around 
half of the boat owner and boat crew respondents, as shown in Table 2, referred to 
corruption when discussing illegal fishing. All groups involved in enforcement – 
BMU leaders, fisheries staff, police and the judiciary – were alleged by respon-
dents of engaging in corrupt practices. Such practices include fisheries staff and 
police being offered, or requiring, a bribe to release seized illegal gears, and fish-
eries staff and BMU leaders taking regular bribes to allow illegal practices to go 
on. It was also alleged that fisheries staff sell-off the seized gears to make money. 
For example, a boat owner explained that ‘when enforcement agents confiscate 
illegal gears from fishermen they are bribed by the owners and sometimes sell 
them off to other fishermen from a different landing site’ (UGBO6) and a fish 
trader/processor observed that ‘even the fisheries officer who took us to court was 
suspended because of receiving bribes’ (UGFTP1).
In the case of Uganda, the Special Enforcement Officers were the recipients 
of strong feelings, with fisherfolk unanimous in their view that these officers did 
not know what they are doing and that corrupt practices were endemic in their 
activities. A fish trader/processor complained that ‘the special enforcement agents 
arrest fishers compliant to the regulations and even confiscate legal fishing gears’ 
(UGFTP6) and a boat crew explained that
Special enforcement officers were not given engines, food and boats so they 
have to gamble and get all. the above. So if he borrows fuel and goes to 
make patrols at the lake and does not come across any fisherman, then he gets 
anyone involved in illegalities, anyone whom he comes across whether he is 
involved in illegalities or not has to be made to pay a bribe in order for him to 
be able to pay the fuel that he has used (UGBC3).
Even government fisheries staff complained about the practices of the Special 
Enforcement Officers as they do not work in collaboration with fisheries officers 
Table 2: Perceptions on and experience of illegal fishing.
Response  
 
Boat owners  
 
Boat crew  
 
Fish traders/
processors
Number   % Number   % Number   %
Believe that illegal activities are 
widespread
  22   65%   30   83%   19   58%
Illegal fishing is due to poverty and 
illegal gears being cheaper than legal
  16   47%   18   50%   6   18%
Illegal fishing cited as the main 
threat to the lake fisheries
  13   38%   10   28%   10   30%
Respondent referred to bribery or 
corruption as occurring in relation to 
illegal fishing
  17   50%   17   47%   10   30%
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and disrupt their own work, in enforcement and beyond. One fisheries staff mem-
ber complained that:
They are doing their own things – their own lootings, for us we are not part 
of them. And they don’t contact us. It is part of our area, but they are doing 
their own things. When they were coming, we were not informed. We don’t 
work with them, because they are dubious. They can easily throw you into 
problems. Somebody comes, he has not got any funding, but he wants to eat, 
he wants to buy a car, he wants to do what ... He gets the nets from here and 
sells them there ... he gets the boats from here and sells them there ... get the 
fish and take to the market ... Something which is out of the procedure, now 
how can you work with such people? (FS)
Police officers are also often involved in enforcement patrols or may become 
involved in enforcement when culprits are handed over to the police by govern-
ment fisheries staff. There were mixed views on the role of police, with some 
support for their role in enforcement, particularly in terms of providing security, 
but there were widespread accusations of the police taking bribes in exchange for 
not pressing charges and returning confiscated gears. A boat owner observed that 
‘when the police come to arrest you due to illegal fishing, they are very vocal and 
they really do their work. But once they have taken you to their station, I don’t 
know what happens because sometimes those arrested leave even with their gears 
and we see them fishing again’ (TZBO4) and a boat crew explained that the police 
‘normally resell the gears to other fishers; at the end, the gears remain being used 
at the landing site, for them to come and confiscate them again and that’s how they 
gain’ (UGBC1). A similar observation was made by fisheries staff who reflected 
on how the activities of police frustrate their work:
At times when you bring the exhibits to police, the police connive with those 
people and they bring old nets to replace the ones you have brought, because 
as soon as you bring those things to police, your work ends there and you can 
only follow up, and follow up, so whatever happens, you cannot do much 
(FS).
Local politicians were not accused of corrupt behaviour per se, but of permitting 
illegalities to continue by preventing enforcement by government officers, par-
ticularly during election periods. A boat owner reflected that ‘politicians normally 
condone illegal fishing during or towards periods of elections in order to amass 
votes’ (UGBO1) and a fisheries officer that ‘local politics is another challenge. 
They view the fishers as their voters. When they are arrested the politician will 
come and complain’ (FS). A BMU leader also complained about the interference 
of political leaders, arguing that they frustrate the work of BMUs:
The political leaders. When they are with us, say during our special meet-
ings, they tell us please you control these illegalities. But when we come and 
enforce in the way we agreed, they always comment in a negative way. Say 
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when the BMU chairman has burnt illegal gears today, they call them and they 
say, ‘No, no, no! Let me, I will talk to him’ (UGBMU).
Finally, BMU leaders were also implicated in corrupt practices, as the ones who 
‘eat from the illegalities’ (FS), and who are ‘siding with illegal fishers’ (FS). 
According to boat crew, ‘I do not see them [BMUs] working well. The people 
who are leaders are corrupt’ (KEBC2) and ‘when BMUs confiscate, they just 
keep in the store and then give back to the owners after some bribe has been given 
to them’ (UGBC4). Although the interviewed BMU leaders demonstrated strong 
support for fostering enforcement and fighting corruption, their behaviour was 
often dependent on the illegal practices of the fishermen. Describing the attitude 
of fishers to their BMUs, one fisheries officer explained:
It depends on the landing site. If you find a landing site that has many illegal 
fishers, and where the BMU wants to eliminate those illegal fishers, you find 
them at loggerhead (…) Illegal fishers will always want to tarnish the image 
of the BMUs even if they are doing the right thing, and many times they have 
won them over (…) They have won the BMUs to their side. They give money, 
they give what ... You find a BMU who was an excellent performer, this time 
he is compromised in one way or another (FS).
Demands for bribes from enforcement officers were attributed to the opportunity 
to make money, particularly in the case of Special Enforcement Officers who 
were alleged not to be given resources to carry out their work. There were mixed 
responses regarding the willingness of boat owners, boat crew and fish traders/
processors to offer or pay bribes. In some cases, fisherfolk were reluctant to pay 
a bribe but felt they had no choice if they wanted to be able to keep their gears 
and/or avoid court. Enforcement officers, particularly the police and judiciary, are 
more powerful than fisherfolk and may demand that a bribe is given; it was stated 
that there are times when informal payments are demanded even in the absence 
of illegalities. In other cases, it was reported that fisherfolk actively offer to pay 
bribes on a regular basis to enable them to continue using illegal gears. However, 
such practices may still reflect an imbalance in power relations as those with ille-
gal gears lack alternatives but to pay a bribe to continue.
This leads to the question of why such people fish illegally and how preva-
lent illegalities are. As reported in the Introduction, illegalities are perceived to 
be highly prevalent and are reported as such in the Fisheries Management Plan 
III (LVFO 2016) and the LVFO Nile Perch Fisheries Management Plan (LVFO 
2015a). In the fieldwork, many respondents reported that they believe that ille-
galities are widespread, with this view being particularly prevalent amongst boat 
crew, as shown in Table 2. Drivers of non-compliance were reported as including 
poverty leading people to buy the cheaper illegal gears, with around half of boat 
owners and boat crew reporting this to be the case. Other reasons cited include 
the high incidence of gear theft on the water, making the purchase of the more 
expensive legal gear unattractive, and the smaller size and stocks of Nile perch 
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meaning that smaller mesh size nets and smaller hooks were preferred so that 
smaller fish than that legally permitted could be caught. The perceived prevalence 
of illegalities was also reflected in the response to the question on the main threats 
to the lake fisheries, with many respondents stating illegal fishing to be the main 
threat, as shown in Table 2. Other threats cited included the increasing number of 
fishers and gears.
How does corruption affect co-management systems and activities?
Fisherfolk expressed the view that the corrupt behaviour of government fisheries 
staff was undermining the work of BMUs, questioning how BMUs can enforce 
regulations if government officers are facilitating and benefiting from illegalities. 
A boat owner observed that ‘the BMU has failed to fight illegal fishing and this is 
attributed to the interference of the enforcement officers who claim to be in con-
trol of fighting practices of illegal fishing’ (UGBO3) and another observed that
The government official does not assist us. The government officials are 
corrupt. There is no transparency between the fishers and the government. 
Fishers using bad gears give corrupt money to the officials so that they can be 
favoured. The BMU officials may be strict with the use of bad gears but the 
government officials are not (KEBO3).
In addition to BMUs being discouraged from enforcing regulations and their work 
being disrupted because of illegal and corrupt practices, respondents claimed that 
fisheries officers intervene in the election of BMU Committee members to get 
people onto the Committee that they can work with to maintain bribes: ‘The fisher-
ies officers normally want people whom they can coordinate with, those who can 
collect for them bribes from illegal fishers’ (UGBC1). In addition, village leaders 
and members of village government were accused of being engaged in illegalities, 
undermining the work of BMUs. A boat crew observed that ‘some village leaders 
own illegal gears and therefore village government protect them and affects the 
function of BMU’ (TZBC2) and a fisheries officer that ‘the village leaders differ 
with BMU because they want to allow illegal fishers to fish while the BMU stops 
them. This results into enmity between the village leadership and BMU’ (FS).
At the same time, the cases of rebel communities in which the illegal fisher-
men prevailed and won over the BMUs demonstrate that corruption among BMU 
leaders prevents enforcement of regulations. Corrupt BMU leaders block coop-
eration with fisheries staff while discouraging compliance and reporting of ille-
galities. Non-reporting of illegalities, however, is attributed to many factors, such 
as fear of revenge, feelings of obligation towards friends and family and moral 
support for fishers who use illegal methods to feed their families, but it can at least 
partly be explained by the perception of corruption among the BMU leaders, and 
other enforcement agents. As noted by one boat crew, ‘illegal fishers are known 
to village leaders and no actions have been taken, so why should I go to inform 
them’ (TZBC5).
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How does corruption impact on the legitimacy of co-management?
Despite accusations of corrupt behaviour against some government fisheries offi-
cers, respondents were almost unanimous in their belief that government has the 
right to tell fishers how to fish. 88% of boat owners and fish traders/processors 
and 89% of boat crew agreed that government should set rules and regulations on 
fishing. A boat owner confirmed that ‘yes, without government it will be chaos 
because of illegal fishing like use of beach seines and monofilament nets. People 
will use the fishery resource irresponsibly and deplete’ (TZBO3). However, some 
also observed that such a right had been undermined by corruption, with one boat 
crew commenting that ‘yes, government has the right to do so, but corruption has 
made the government fail to protect our fisheries resources’ (TZBC6).
Some respondents felt that the low level of fines for infringements suggested 
that the government was not really serious about enforcement, with a boat crew 
observing that ‘even the fines charged for involvement in illegal fishing are lit-
tle so we think government is not serious’ (UGBC3). However, others thought 
that the experience of being fined, including the level of the fine, did encourage 
change in behaviour, as the continuous process of being caught and having to 
pay bribes can, in itself, be a deterrent as it becomes expensive and tiresome over 
time. One boat owner reported that ‘in 2014 enforcement officers found my crews 
with a beach seine and took them to court after I had refused to pay them a bribe 
of 1,200,000 Ugandan shillings. My crews were prosecuted and I was charged a 
fine of 500,000 Ugandan shillings, since then I resorted to legal fishing’ (UGBO4) 
and a fish trader/processor also suggested a change in practice, ‘yes, once I was 
caught with small fish and sent to court. After that I stopped to process small fish 
because I lost my time and money’ (TZFTP1).
Furthermore, it was generally reported that very few cases go to court, and 
these cases often involved poorer members of the fisherfolk with insufficient 
funds to pay the bribe. One boat owner reported that ‘a few cases are taken to 
court. Some are solved in the office of the BMU chairman and others are solved 
at the shorelines by paying bribes to the enforcement officers. Those ones some-
times fail to pay bribes to the enforcement officers and it is the boat crews that are 
normally taken to court because they don’t have money to pay the enforcement 
officers’ (UGBO3).
The research found strong evidence that efficient and consistent enforcement 
leads to the curbing of illegalities, but it also established that among the respon-
dents very few people who used illegal gears were in the end prosecuted and 
punished. The low fines and the inconsistent use of fines and court appearances 
undermine the legitimacy of the fisheries management system in place.
6. Discussion
The article sought to answer the research question ‘how does corruption linked to 
illegalities affect the performance and legitimacy of fisheries co-management?’. 
From the findings, it was confirmed that corruption takes place and appears to be 
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endemic within the fisheries of Lake Victoria, reflecting perceptions of high levels 
of corruption within public services more generally in East Africa (Transparency 
International-Kenya 2014) and the reported embedded or institutionalised nature 
of corruption (Hope 2014; Muhumuza 2016). Not only is corruption endemic in 
the fisheries sector, it is strongly connected to illegalities. Corruption provides a 
way for fishers to sustain illegalities and avoid penalties and imprisonment, and, 
in turn, illegalities provide opportunities for many stakeholders to gain financially.
The endemic nature of corrupt behaviour suggests that the practice can be 
viewed as a ‘collective action’ problem, explained as: ‘if you expect others in your 
community to be corrupt, you will be incentivized to act corruptly because the 
individual costs of engagement in principled behaviors outweigh the individual 
benefits’ (Carson and Prado 2016, 58). Stakeholders believe fisheries illegalities 
and corruption to be widespread, disincentivising the adoption of legal fishing 
practices and the avoidance of corruption.
In contrast to other literature, where the focus was on specific stakeholder 
groups, such as government officers (inspectors) in South Africa (Sundström 
2013) and BMU and fisheries officers in Kenya (Etiegni et al. 2017), it was found 
that members of all stakeholder groups – fisheries staff, BMU Committee mem-
bers, police and the judiciary – are implicated in corruption, with local politicians 
also involved by stopping enforcement to secure votes during election periods. 
The Special Enforcement Unit in Uganda formed by the Secretary of State for 
Fisheries outside of the fisheries directorate was particularly lambasted by fisher-
folk and fisheries staff, who accused them of seizing legal as well as illegal gears 
and demanding bribes for their return. The introduction of the Special Enforcement 
Unit, using security personnel from outside of the fisheries department, reflects 
the power of the Minister, though their motivation, beyond espoused removal of 
illegalities, is unclear.
The link between corruption and illegalities falls within both rationalist and 
normative perspectives on compliance. Fisherfolk are likely to assess the poten-
tial of being caught and the cost of the bribe versus a fine, factoring in the loss of 
gear and days fishing or trading as appropriate, taking a rationalist perspective. 
However, the perpetuation of corruption and illegalities is facilitated by social and 
power relations, with compliance behaviour explained by a normative perspec-
tive. Trust between those engaged in illegal practices and enforcing officers is 
established over time, reflecting Sundström’s (2013) observations of relations of 
trust enabling corruption and illegalities in South African fisheries.
Fisherfolk were clear in their view that the corrupt practices of government 
officers were undermining the work of the BMUs. It was expressed that the fish-
erfolk could not trust government officials because regulations were not being 
enforced, at least not consistently. Such a lack of trust and a demonstrable lack 
of commitment to enforcement by some government officials undermine the 
legitimacy of fisheries management. The undermining of BMUs through fisher-
ies officers interfering in committee elections to get certain people in place and 
by allowing illegalities in exchange for bribes limits the scope for BMUs to take 
Compliance, corruption and co-management 17
action to improve compliance with regulations. The prevalence of systemic cor-
ruption erodes trust in the system and in the willingness of government to take 
fisheries management seriously. This implies that co-management is being under-
mined by the behaviour of some fisheries officers and other actors. This is of 
concern for research and practice as the undermining of the legitimacy and per-
formance of co-management has not, to our knowledge, been widely researched 
or recognised.
The inference that corruption and illegalities are undermining the legitimacy of 
co-management confirm Lawrence’s (2013) observations from research on Lake 
Victoria in Uganda where he found that the legitimacy of the BMUs was under-
mined by the involvement of agencies (police and army personnel) in fisheries 
enforcement and by corrupt relationships between BMUs and Fisheries Officers. 
Lawrence (2013, 186) reported that ‘the BMUs were given authority, but inter-
vention by police and army personnel confuse and delegitimize that authority’ 
and that BMU Committee members complained that ‘actions taken from higher 
political levels delegitimized their efforts to control illegal fishing, collect taxes, 
or have any influence over fishing activities in general’.
It is evident then that co-management of Lake Victoria fisheries is being under-
mined, evidenced by BMUs being unwilling to enforce regulations because of the 
corrupt practices of fisheries staff and police; by some fisheries staff and fishing 
communities actively seeking and enabling fisherfolk who are willing to facilitate 
illegalities through the payment of bribes to be elected to BMU Committees; and, 
by politicians interfering in the work of fisheries officers and BMUs by stop-
ping sanctions and intervening in BMU Committee elections. Figure 1 illustrates 
these relationships by showing how weak enforcement, resulting from limited 
Weak enforcement
– Lack of resources – money,
   personnel and equipment
– Lack of political will to
   enforce effectively – protect
   votes and livelihoods
– Corrupt practices –
   encourages patrols but no
   real enforcement
Non-compliance and corrupt
practices maintained; potentially
threatened fish stocks, livelihoods
and food security
The performance and legitimacy of
co-management system is
undermined; co-management seen
as not delivering on improved
compliance and increased fish
stocks. 
Figure 1: Corruption, compliance and co-management.
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resources, political factors and corruption, leads to illegalities and further cor-
ruption, and potentially to threatened fish stocks, livelihoods and food security, 
in turn undermining the performance and legitimacy of co-management and to 
further weakening of enforcement.
7. Conclusion
From the evidence above, it can be concluded that the scale and entrenched nature 
of the illegalities-corruption linkage undermines fisheries co-management. This 
undermining is fuelled by the lack of genuine enforcement by authorities and the 
lack of incentives for BMUs to take enforcement seriously due to the prevalence 
of corruption. The legitimacy of co-management is in turn undermined by the per-
ceived inadequate performance of co-management and by eroded trust between 
fishers and authorities (fisheries staff, police, judiciary and local politicians). 
The scale of corrupt practices linked to illegalities is demonstrated through the 
involvement of actors from all stakeholder groups and by the consistent reference 
to these practices when respondents were asked about their experience of illegali-
ties and enforcement.
There are divergent views that could be taken on the undermining of co-man-
agement by corruption and illegalities. It could be concluded that the very nature 
of co-management is conducive to systemic corruption. The formation of com-
mittees at the beach level, with power to contribute to decisions on vessel licens-
ing and to enforce regulations with fisheries officers, opens up opportunities for 
bribes to be offered and sought. This view is supported by Etiegni et al. (2017), 
for example, who call for the design of co-management on Lake Victoria to be 
reconsidered in response to the constraints on BMUs in enforcing regulations due 
to social ties and the prevalence of corruption.
An alternative view is supported by two observations. Firstly, there have 
always been community-level structures at the local level in fisheries in these 
three countries, though not always democratically elected. This is due to the 
population size at many fish landing sites, which can be in the thousands, mean-
ing that a form of organisation is useful to government and others working with 
fishing communities. It cannot be concluded that an alternative form of local 
representation would avoid involvement in corrupt practices linked to illegali-
ties. Secondly, the systemic nature of corruption within the three countries sug-
gests that it would be ambitious to expect the fisheries sector to be immune from 
corruption.
The example of how corruption and illegalities undermine co-management 
suggests that research on co-management should give greater attention to fac-
tors that may undermine the potential for success. Co-management systems and 
processes exist within a wider social, economic and political system, and, where 
often practices such as corruption exist, it is unlikely that co-management will be 
untouched and unaffected.
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